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Combating Incitement to
Terrorism on the Internet:
Comparative Approaches in the
United States and United Kingdom
and the Need for an
International Solution
ABSTRACT
In recent years, terrorist use of the Internet has been gaining in
popularity, with more than several thousand radical or extremist
websites in existence today. Because the Internet transcends physical
and geographic boundaries, combating terrorist incitement on the
Internet requires cross-border global cooperation. Although the
international community has taken steps to combat the problem with
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1624, the state
parties to these resolutions have been unable to close the significant
holes in the current international legal framework, and there is little
evidence that terrorist use of the Internet for purposes of incitement is
being prosecuted successfully. Certain states are limited by their own
domestic legal framework, including the United States, which is
significantly limited in its ability to combat incitement because of the
constitutional restraints imposed by the First Amendment. Despite
more aggressive legislation and the absence of any constitutional
limitations, the United Kingdom has been similarly unsuccessful in
combating and prosecuting incitement to commit terrorist acts. This
Note compares the measures taken by the United States and the United
Kingdom in combating terrorist use of the Internet for purposes of
incitement, explains why such measures have been limited in effect,
and extends lessons learned from these case studies to the international
framework.
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INCITEMENT TO TERRORISM
After Operation Enduring Freedom1 removed the Taliban and
denied safe haven to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and its
followers moved their base of operations to cyberspace.2  By all
objective measures, terrorist use of the Internet 3 has gained in
popularity since then. 4 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) documents several thousand radical or extremist websites in
existence worldwide today, 5 compared with only a handful in 2000.6
DHS believes that the versatility of the Internet has created a virtual
safe haven for terrorist communication, recruitment, training, and
preparation for attacks, defining a safe haven as "an area of relative
security exploited by terrorists to indoctrinate, recruit, coalesce, train,
and regroup, as well as prepare and support their operations."7 The
United Kingdom's Home Office, the lead government department for
immigration and passports, drug policy, counter-terrorism and police,
attributes the popularity of terrorist websites to the fact that they "are
difficult to monitor and trace; they can be established anywhere and
have global reach; they are anonymous, cheap and instantaneous; and
1. Operation Enduring Freedom is a multinational military operation initiated in
October 2001 to combat terrorism and bring security to Afghanistan in collaboration with
Afghan forces. Fact Sheet: Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. DEP'T STATE, JAN. 31, 2006,
available at http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2006/060131/epf2O7.htm. Operation Enduring
Freedom operations led to the collapse of the Taliban regime and helped bring a measure of
security and stability to Afghanistan for the first time in a generation. Id.
2. Internet Jihad: A World Wide Web of Terror, ECONOMIST, July 14, 2007, at 29-
30 [hereinafter Internet Jihad].
3. It is important to distinguish "terrorist use of the Internet" from
"cyberterrorism." See Maura Conway, Encounters with Internet-Based Counter-Terrorism:
Assessing the Quiet Online 'War on Terrorism' 2-4 (Sch. of Law & Gov't, Dublin City Univ.,
Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p-mla-apa-research
_citation2/5/3/8/4/pages253846p253846-1.php. While "cyberterrorism" has been defined as
"premeditated, politically motivated attack[s] against information, computer systems,
computer programs, and data," "terrorist use of the Internet" is a much broader concept
that can refer to more mundane and everyday terrorist uses of the Internet, including the
dissemination of information and terrorist recruitment. Id.
4. Steve Coll & Susan B. Glasser, Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of
Operations, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-dynlcontent/article/2005/08/05/AR2005080501138.html. Gabriel Weimann, a professor
at the University of Haifa in Israel, says there are more than 4,500 terrorist-related
websites today, compared to only 12 websites 8 years ago. Id.
5. DEP'T HOMELAND SECURITY, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2005:
SUPPLEMENT: REPORT TO CONGRESS REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 7120(B) OF THE 9/11
COMMISSION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 2004, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org
/security/library/report/2006/c-rprt-terrorism_2005-supO2.htm [hereinafter DEP'T
HOMELAND SECURITY, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2005].
6. Internet Jihad, supra note 2, at 29-30.
7. DEP'T HOMELAND SECURITY, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2005, supra
note 5, at ch. 1.
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it requires no special expertise to set up a website."8 The Home Office
believes that extremists trying to evade detection in traditional
spheres of activity are making more extensive use of the Internet to
spread propaganda and incite others to terrorism. 9
Terrorist use of the Internet is also burgeoning because
monitoring the Internet is difficult and requires cross-border global
cooperation. 10 Saudi Arabian authorities recently expressed concerns
about the difficulty in obtaining cooperation to shut down extremist
sites hosted by servers located outside their borders, in places like
Europe and the United States." Without international cooperation,
terrorist groups' websites that have been shut down in one state can
simply find a new host in another state, thereby defeating the efforts
of the original host state. 12 For this same reason, the European Union
has launched a "Check the Web" initiative, an open-source monitoring
and database creation project handled by the European Law
Enforcement Organization (Europol), for the purposes of monitoring
the Internet for terrorist use, especially recruitment, training, and
propaganda.' 3 No matter how much political will it may have, one
state simply cannot resolve the problem alone. Accordingly, the
international community is taking steps to cooperate and respond on a
global scale.
While the Internet can serve many potential uses for terrorists,
this Note will focus on measures by the United States and United
Kingdom to combat terrorist use of the Internet for purposes of
incitement to, and the glorification of, terrorism.14 Part I will describe
the international legal framework relevant to this issue, outlining the
sources of international legal authority for efforts to combat
incitement as well as the sources of international law that limit this
authority in order to protect freedom of expression. Part II will
examine the state-specific measures and respective tools that the
8. HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBING IN
LONDON ON 7TH JULY 2005, 2006, H.C. 1087, at 31, available at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506fhc 1010871087.pdf.
9. Id.
10. Conway, supra note 3, at 12.
11. Christopher Boucek, The Sakinah Campaign and Internet Counter-
Radicalization in Saudi Arabia, CTC SENTINNEL, Aug. 2008, at 1, available at
http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinelVollIss9.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Council of the European Union Working Party on Terrorism, Council
Conclusions on Cooperation to Combat Terrorist Use of the Internet, 2007, 8457/2/07.
14. This Note focuses exclusively on the prosecution of suspected terrorists through




United States and United Kingdom currently employ to combat
incitement. Part III will present case studies from the United States
and United Kingdom in order to compare their relative effectiveness
in combating incitement, and their degree of compliance with United
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 162415 on prohibiting
incitement to terrorism through law. Based on lessons learned from
the legal frameworks of the United States and United Kingdom, Part
IV will propose solutions to better address terrorist use of the Internet
for purposes of incitement. Finally, Part V will conclude the Note by
summarizing the issue and proposed solutions.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Combating Incitement to Terrorism
Large-scale terrorist attacks, including those of September 11,
2001, in the United States and July 7, 2005, in the United Kingdom,
have spawned a wide array of international and domestic
counterterrorism laws. When the United Nations adopted UNSCR
1373 in response to the September 11th attacks, it demonstrated only
minimal awareness of the issue of terrorist use of the Internet. 16
UNSCR 1373, focused primarily on preventing and suppressing the
financing of terrorist acts, 17 merely called upon states to "find ways of
intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information"
on terrorist activities, including the "use of communications
technologies by terrorist groups."' 8 The resolution also established a
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor implementation of
the resolution and required states to report to the CTC on the steps
they have taken towards implementation. 19 The deficiencies in
UNSCR 1373 reflect the fact that important factual information
surrounding the September 1 1th attacks had yet to be uncovered. The
9/11 Commission Report,20 released in 2004, demonstrated the
inability of financing laws alone to prevent acts of terrorism, and
15. S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005) (calling on states to take
certain measures relating to the incitement of terrorist acts).




20. THE NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTAcKs UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 REPORT
(2004).
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revealed Al Qaeda's heavy reliance on the Internet in planning and
coordinating the September 1 1th attacks on the United States.2 1
The United Kingdom's Home Office investigation into the July
7, 2005 London bombings revealed that the bombings were a low-
budget operation carried out by four men, with no connections to Al
Qaeda, who made extensive use of the Internet in carrying out their
attacks. 22 In the aftermath of the July 7th bombings, the United
Nations adopted UNSCR 1624,23 a document demonstrating far more
awareness of the challenges posed by terrorist use of the Internet than
UNSCR 1373.24 UNSCR 1624, sponsored by the United Kingdom,
condemned incitement to terrorism and repudiated attempts at the
justification or glorification (apologie)25 of terrorist acts.26  It also
recognized the importance of acting cooperatively "to prevent
terrorists from exploiting sophisticated technology, communications,
and resources to incite support for criminal acts," and called upon all
states to adopt such measures "as may be necessary and appropriate
and in accordance with their obligations under international law to...
[p]rohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts."27 Once
again, states were required to report to the CTC on implementation of
this resolution. 28 UNSCR 1373 and UNSCR 1624, taken together,
form the foundation for current international efforts to combat
incitement to terrorism on the Internet.
21. Jack Kelley, Militants Wire Web with Links to Jihad, USA TODAY, July 10,
2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002/07/1O/web-terror-cover.htm.
Federal officials found thousands of encrypted messages, dating from May 2000 through
September 9, 2001, that had been posted in a password-protected area of a website on the
computer of arrested al Qaeda terrorist Abu Zubaydah, the reported mastermind of the
attacks. Id.
22. See Sarah Lyall, London Bombers Tied to Internet, Not Al Qaeda, Newspaper
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/11
/worldleurope/lllondon.html.
23. See S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 15.
24. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 16.
25. S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 15, at Preamble.
26. Speaking on the adoption of UNSCR 1624, then Prime Minister Tony Blair said
the Security Council had to take action against those who incite extremism "by fighting not
just their methods, but their motivation, their twisted reasoning, [and] wretched excuses
for terror." Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Meeting of World Leaders
Calls for Legal Prohibition of Terrorist Incitement, Enhanced Steps to Prevent Armed
Conflict, (Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005
/sc8496.doc.htm.




B. Combating Incitement While Preserving Freedom of Expression
Measures taken to implement UNSCR 1373 and UNSCR 1624
must comply with other international legal obligations, including the
obligation of states to protect and promote the right to freedom of
expression. UNSCR 1624 recalls "the right to freedom of expression
reflected in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"
(UDHR) and "the right to freedom of expression in Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (ICCPR) and
declares that "any restrictions thereon shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary on the grounds set out in
paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the ICCPR."29 The UDHR, adopted after
World War II, was the first international instrument to guarantee the
right to freedom of expression. 30 This protection was included in
Article 19 of the ICCPR, which guarantees that "[e]veryone shall have
the right to freedom of expression . . . includ[ing] freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice."
31
In this international legal framework, however, freedom of
expression is not absolute. For example, Article 29(2) of the UDHR
provides that the exercise of freedom of expression is subject "to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and
of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order, and the
general welfare in a democratic society."32 Similarly, Article 20 of the
ICCPR calls upon state parties to prohibit by law "[a]ny advocacy of
national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility, or violence." 33 Thus, international efforts to
combat terrorist use of the Internet must conform to these protective
34
29. Id.
30. Article 19 of the UDHR provides that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 74-75, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/043/88/IMG/NROO4388.pdf?OpenEle
ment [hereinafter UDHR].
31. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19(2), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3b/a_ccpr.htm.
[hereinafter ICCPR].
32. UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 29(2).
33. ICCPR, supra note 31, at art. 20(2).
34. International human rights law imposes positive obligations on the state to
take effective preventative measures to protect the lives and physical integrity of everyone
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and restrictive goals simultaneously. Moreover, measures taken by
individual UN member states to combat terrorist use of the Internet
for incitement must not only comply with their international legal
obligations but also their domestic legal frameworks as well.
II. STATE-SPECIFIC MEASURES: LEGAL TOOLS FOR
COMBATING INCITEMENT
Given the pervasive and global nature of terrorism, it may be
initially surprising that the September 11th attacks in the United
States and the July 7th attacks in the United Kingdom were so
influential in shaping the international legal framework for combating
terrorism. However, when one considers that both the United States
and the United Kingdom are two of the five permanent members of
the United Nations Security Council, 35 this influence is less
surprising. Despite their equally strong advocacy for international
cooperation to combat terrorism, the United States and the United
Kingdom have very different domestic legal systems that influence
their ability to comply with international legal obligations to combat
terrorist use of the Internet for incitement. In general, the United
Kingdom is more willing to prosecute people for terrorist speech on the
Internet, including incitement, while the United States is more
conservative in prosecuting terrorist speech and incitement.
36
A. THE UNITED STATES' APPROACH TO INCITEMENT
1. Constitutional Limits on Prosecuting Incitement and the Impact of
the First Amendment
While the United States was a strong proponent of UNSCR
1373 and UNSCR 1624, it faces unique challenges in their
implementation. In its June 2006 report to the CTC, 37 the United
States emphasized that the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
within their jurisdiction against the threat of terrorism. See House of Lords House of
Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human
Rights: Prosecution and Pre-Charge Detention, 2005-6, H.L. Paper 240, H.C. 1576, at 8,
available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/jt200506/jtselect
/jtrights/240/240.pdf.
35. Membership of the Security Council, http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (last
visited Mar. 16, 2009).
36. Don Van Natta, Jr., Cleric Convicted of Stirring Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2006,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE3DC143EF93
BA35751COA9609C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2.
37. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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limits its ability to prosecute or criminalize incitement to commit acts
of terrorism. 38 The report points out that the United States has long
asserted its constitutionally imposed challenges in complying with
international legal devices. For example, it points out that when the
United States ratified the ICCPR, it did so subject to certain
conditions.39 Specifically, the United States filed a declaration with
respect to Article 1940, stating that "fundamental human rights
existing in any State Party may not be diminished on the pretext that
the Covenant recognizes them to a lesser extent."41 In addition, the
United States filed a reservation 42 to Article 20, which requires the
prohibition of hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility, or violence. 43 The reservation stated that Article 20 "does
not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United
States that would restrict the right of free speech and association
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States."44 The
United States has made it clear that efforts to combat terrorist use of
the Internet for incitement would invoke the same principles applied
to incitement to discrimination or hate speech.
45
In the United States, regulation of the Internet is subject to the
same conventional First Amendment jurisprudence as the regulation
of any other media.46 In Reno v. ACLU, the U.S. Supreme Court found
that the Internet is entitled to the full First Amendment protections
afforded to other media like the print press, refusing to concede that it
should be subject to the greater regulation allowed of broadcast
media. 47  In particular, the prosecution or criminalization of
incitement to commit acts of terrorism in the United States is limited
to the strict set of circumstances set out in Brandenburg v. Ohio.48
Brandenburg held that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation, except where
38. Response of the United States of America to the Counter-Terrorism Committee:
United States Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005), U.N. Doe.
S/2006/397 (June 16, 2006) [hereinafter Response of the USA to the CTC].
39. Id.
40. See supra text accompanying note 31.
41. Response of the USA to the CTC, supra note 38, at 4.
42. Id.
43. ICCPR, supra note 31, at art. 20.
44. Response of the USA to the CTC, supra note 38, at 4.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 43, 44.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 47.
47. 521 U.S. 844, 868-70 (1997).
48. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless actions and is
likely to incite or produce such action.
49
Since the Brandenburg test requires proof of both the intent to
incite or produce unlawful action and the likelihood that the speech
will actually incite imminent unlawful action, the United States has
not criminalized or prosecuted the mere publication of written
materials as incitement.50 Thus, the majority of terrorist propaganda
found on the Internet today, if viewed as the mere publication of
written material, cannot be prosecuted under U.S. criminal law.
2. Statutory Authority for Prosecuting Incitement and the Primacy of
Material Support
Although traditional First Amendment jurisprudence limits
the ability of the United States to prosecute incitement to the strict
set of circumstances set forth in Brandenburg, the Patriot Act, signed
into law on October 26, 2001, significantly expanded the authority of
U.S. law enforcement agencies to use new and existing laws to fight
terrorism.5' In particular, the robust inchoate offenses and "material
support" provisions in the Patriot Act permit the prosecution of
preparatory acts to substantive criminal conduct, including incitement
to terrorism. 52 An inchoate offense is "[a] step toward the commission
of another crime, the step in itself being serious enough to merit
punishment."53  The three classic inchoate offenses, especially
prominent in the context of terrorism prosecutions, are attempt,
conspiracy and solicitation. 54  The "step" towards these inchoate
terrorism offenses must have "material support."55
The material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339(a) and (b),
prohibit knowingly or intentionally providing, attempting to provide,
or conspiring to provide material support or resources to a terrorist
organization. 56 The Patriot Act broadened the definition of "material
support" to include "any property, tangible or intangible, or service,
including . . . training, expert advice or assistance . . . [or]
49. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
50. Response of the USA to the CTC, supra note 38, at 4.
51. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
52. See infra text accompanying notes 56-58.
53. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY at 1111 (8th ed. 2004).
54. Id.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 56-58.
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(a), (b) (2000).
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communications equipment."57  Under the statutory language,
terrorist use of the Internet could fall under intangible "property,"
"service[s]," "training," "expert advice or assistance," or
"communications equipment." Thus, without necessarily referring to
"incitement," the Patriot Act criminalizes certain speech-related
conduct that supports or encourages violent acts of terrorism, thereby
allowing authorities to prosecute individuals as soon as they
communicate the intent to commit an act of terrorism or conspire with
others in working to carry out the act.58 Since prosecutions under the
''material support" statutes do not require that any act of terrorism
actually occurred, the government is able to pursue a strategy of
prevention of terrorism.
Other arrows in the United States' quiver for criminalizing
incitement to commit acts of terrorism are its criminal sedition and
criminal solicitation laws. U.S. criminal sedition laws are intended to
prevent the forceful overthrow of the government and therefore are
often applicable to terrorist plots directed at the United States or
planned for execution on U.S. soil. 59 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2384
criminalizes seditious conspiracy, prohibiting two or more persons
from conspiring "to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the
government of the United States, or to levy war against them."
60
Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 allows the government to prosecute a
person who "prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells,
distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter
advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or
propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United
States by force or violence, or attempts to do SO."61 Moreover, the
federal criminal solicitation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 373, allows U.S.
authorities to prosecute anyone who "solicits, commands, induces, or
otherwise endeavors to persuade" another person to engage in
felonious conduct "with intent that another person engage in [the]
conduct."62 Criminal solicitation is a free-standing offense, such that
requesting the unlawful act is itself a crime, whether or not the
offense is ever carried out, so long as the circumstances of such
solicitation are "strongly corroborative" of such intent.63 Thus, any
terrorist using the Internet to incite others to commit violent acts of
57. Id.
58. Response of the USA to the CTC, supra note 38, at 4.
59. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2384, 2385 (2000).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (2000).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2000).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) (2000).
63. MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 19A.01.
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terrorism, whether or not on U.S. soil, could conceivably be prosecuted
under one of the aforementioned federal statutes.
Even before the United States assumed international
obligations to combat terrorism, these statutes were successfully
applied to prosecute terrorists for speech-related crimes. 64  For
example, in 1995 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York convicted terrorist Sheik Omar Amad Ali Abdel Rahman of
engaging in a seditious conspiracy to wage a war of urban terrorism,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2384, for his involvement in alleged terrorist
plots to bomb New York City facilities and to assassinate certain
people. 65 In its case against Rahman, the government relied heavily
on Rahman's speeches and writings.6 6 On appeal, Rahman contended
that 18 U.S.C. § 2384 imposes an unconstitutional burden on free
speech and the free exercise of religion in violation of the First
Amendment because it criminalizes protected expression and is overly
broad as well as unconstitutionally vague. 67
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected
Rahman's claim, noting that "while the state may not criminalize the
expression of views-even [if that] view [is] that [the] violent
overthrow of the government is desirable-it may nonetheless outlaw
encouragement, inducement, or conspiracy to take violent action."68
The court added that speech which crosses the line beyond mere
expression, becoming criminal solicitation, procurement of criminal
activity, or conspiracy to violate the laws, is not protected simply
because it is expressed through the medium of religious preaching. 69
The court found that Rahman's speeches were not simply the
expression of ideas but rather "constituted the crime of conspiracy to
wage war on the United States," subject to prosecution under 18
U.S.C. § 2384.70
In sum, the First Amendment protects the freedom of
expression and prevents the United States from prosecuting
individuals-including suspected terrorists-on the basis of speech
alone. 71 However, federal statutes provide the authority to prosecute
64. See infra text accompanying notes 65-70.
65. See Joseph P. Fried, Sheik Sentenced to Life in Prison in Bombing Plot, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996, available at http://www.nytimes.com11996/01/18/nyregion/sheik-
sentenced-to-life-in-prison-in-bombing-plot.html; see 18 U.S.C. § 2384.
66. Id.
67. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 115-16 (2d Cir. 1999).
68. Id. at 115.
69. Id. at 116-17.
70. Id.
71. See supra Part II.A.1.
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individuals for certain speech-related conduct, including incitement to
terrorism when such incitement is deemed a significant "step" in the
commission of, or material support for, other terrorism-related
offenses, including attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation to commit acts
of terrorism.
72
B. The United Kingdom's Legal Approach to Incitement
Upon sentencing Abu Hamza al-Masri, the radical Muslim
cleric convicted of inciting murder of Jews and other non-Muslims,
Lord Justice Hughes, of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales,
stated:
You are entitled to your views and in this country you are entitled to express them,
but only up to the point where you incite murder or use language calculated to
incite racial hatred .... No one can say now what damage your words may have
caused. No one can say whether audiences acted on your words. The potential for
both direct and indirect damage is simply incalculable."
' 7 3
Justice Hughes's opinion best captures the United Kingdom's
more aggressive approach to combating terrorist use of the Internet
for purposes of incitement. This aggressive approach is facilitated by
the important fact that the United Kingdom does not have a written
constitution that regulates the powers of the government and
enumerates the fundamental rights and duties of its citizens as does
the United States. 74 Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom
need not adhere to constitutional provisions that can only be changed
through the complex legislative procedure of amendment and
ratification. 75  Therefore, the United Kingdom has been able to
promulgate anti-terror 76  legislation without any constitutional
constraints similar to those in the United States.
The primary weapon in the United Kingdom's anti-terror
arsenal is the Terrorism Act 2000. 77 In response to the changing
nature and threat of international terrorism, Parliament enacted the
Terrorism Act 2000 to replace the previous temporary anti-terror
72. See supra Part II.A.2.
73. Simon Freeman, Abu Hamza Jailed for Seven Years for Inciting Murder, TIMES
(U.K.), Feb. 7, 2006, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk
/article728117.ece.
74. Joshua Rozenberg, UK Politics: Talking Politics, Does the UK Have a
Constitution, BBC NEWS, June 3, 1998, (U.K.) available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi
/uk-news/politics/88136.stm.
75. Id.
76. I use the term "anti-terror" instead of "counterterrorism" in the U.K. context
because that is the term favored by the British authorities. For the purposes of this Note,
the two terms should be considered synonymous.
77. See infra Part II.B.
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legislation that dealt primarily with the ongoing fighting in Northern
Ireland. 78 The act instituted three primary legal innovations. First,
the act's proscription provisions made it illegal for certain terrorist
groups to operate in the United Kingdom, including certain
international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. 79 Second, the act gave
law enforcement officials enhanced police powers, including broader
"stop and search" powers and the authority to detain terrorism
suspects for up to twenty-eight days after arrest.8 0 Finally, the act
introduced new criminal offenses, including inciting terrorist acts;
seeking or providing training for terrorist purposes at home or
overseas; providing instruction or training in the use of firearms,
explosives or chemical, biological or nuclear weapons; and the
possession of documents "of a kind likely to be useful to a person
committing or preparing an act of terrorism."81  Coupled with the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 (RIPA), which allows
law enforcement to use methods of surveillance and information
gathering to help the prevention of crime, including terrorism,8 2 the
United Kingdom has some of the most advanced legal capabilities for
combating and prosecuting terrorist use of the Internet.
The July 7, 2005 London bombings led the British government
to strengthen its already robust anti-terror legislation.8 3 Just days
after the bombings, Charles Clarke, the secretary of state for the
Home Department, addressed the House of Commons on the question
of the home secretary's authority to combat terrorism:
In recent decades, for all home secretaries, the criteria for exercising these powers
have generally been grounds of national security, public order or risk to the United
Kingdom's good relations with a third country. In going beyond these grounds, we
rightly need to tread very carefully indeed in areas that relate to free speech.
However, in the circumstances that we now face, I have decided that it is right to
broaden the use of these powers to deal with those who foment terrorism, or seek
to provoke others to commit terrorist acts. To that end, I intend to draw up a list of
unacceptable behaviors that fall within those powers-for example, preaching,
running websites or writing articles that are intended to foment or provoke
78. The Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11 (Eng.), available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/terrorism-act/.
79. The Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 78.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Home Office: About RIPA, http://security.homeoffice.gov.uklripa/about-ripa/
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009). RIPA gave the United Kingdom some of the most advanced
Internet spying capabilities in the world by enabling the government to demand that an
Internet service provider secretly provide access to a customer's communications and allow
the government to monitor people's Internet activities, among other things. Id.
83. See discussion supra pp. 13-14.
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terrorism. The list will be indicative rather than exhaustive and we will consult on
it, because it is important that we work with communities.
8 4
The British Chief of Police also called for increased authority to
combat terrorist use of the Internet, asking specifically for the "power
to attack identified websites."8 5
In response to political and other pressures, Parliament
approved the Terrorism Act 2006,86 purportedly broadening the
government's authority to deal with those who foment terrorism or
seek to provoke others to commit terrorist acts.8 7 Part 1 of the act
creates a series of new criminal offenses to assist the police in
combating terrorism, including the encouragement of terrorism and
dissemination of terrorist publications. The act prohibits "a statement
that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the
public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or
other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or
instigation of acts of terrorism or [other] offences."88 A statement that
is likely to be understood as constituting encouragement is a
statement that
(a) glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future, or
generally) of such acts or offenses; (b) and . . . from which those members of the
public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being
glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances.
8 9
The prohibition on encouragement, at least in light of this statutory
definition, is ostensibly broad.
The United Kingdom has recently come under political
pressure for its aggressive approach to combat incitement 90 from
groups like Human Rights Watch (HRW), which has criticized the
government's criminalization of encouragement as an unnecessary
84. 436 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 1255, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.UK/pa/cm2005O6/cmhansrd/vO5O720/debtext/50720-
04.htm.
85. Conway, supra note 3, at 10.
86. The Terrorism Act 2006, ch. 11, (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga-2006001 1_en_l.
87. See Press Release, Home Office, Tackling Terrorism-Behaviours Unacceptable
in the UK (Aug. 24, 2005), available at http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-
releases/TacklingTerrorism-BehavioursUn?version= 1.
88. The Terrorism Act 2006, supra note 86, part 1, § 1.
89. Id. § (3)(a), (b).
90. Even the government was initially opposed to a new offense that would prohibit
"encouraging terrorism". See House of Lords House of Commons Joint Committee on
Human Rights, supra note 34 ("Such wide drafting goes against the principle of clarity of
the law, does not sufficiently define what behaviour is expected of persons subject to the
law, and can have significant negative effect on freedom of speech in a democratic
society.").
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measure that will have an excessively chilling effect on the freedom of
expression. 91 First, HRW alleges that the mens rea requirement for
commission of the offense is unclear. 92 Under the act, a person
commits an offense whether he actually intends to encourage or
merely is reckless as to whether his statement will encourage an act of
terrorism.93  Second, HRW argues that the offense lacks legal
certainty such that people may not necessarily be able to regulate
their conduct to avoid infringement. 94 Because the act criminalizes
"glorification," it may be hard for individuals to predict when a
statement would constitute encouragement of terrorism as opposed to
when it would constitute a legitimate exercise of free expression.
Third, HRW criticizes the fact that the act does not require any causal
link between the criminal act of encouragement and actual violence
perpetrated. 95 For purposes of the act, it is irrelevant "whether any
person is in fact encouraged or induced by the statement to commit,
prepare, or instigate" a terrorist act or offense.
96
Human Rights Watch's criticisms brought the United
Kingdom's encouragement provisions under the scrutiny of the United
Nations Human Rights Committee, 97  the body that assesses
compliance with the ICCPR. The United Nations Human Rights
Committee criticized the definition of "encouragement of terrorism" in
Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 as "broad and vague," particularly
because an individual can commit the offence in the absence of any
intent, as long as the statements are understood by some members of
the public to constitute encouragement to commit acts of terrorism.
98
The United Nations Human Rights Committee suggested that the
government amend the statute's language to avoid 'disproportionate
interference with freedom of expression' guaranteed in Article 19 of
the ICCPR.99 The recent attention HRW has brought upon Section 1
of the Terrorism Act 2006 recalls the limitations set in place in
UNSCR 1373 and UNSCR 1624 to comply with international legal
91. See infra text accompanying notes 92-96.
92. Human Rights Watch Briefing on the Terrorism Bill 2005,
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/ecaIU.K. 1105/3.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).
93. The Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 78, at part 1, § (1), (2)(b)(i), (ii).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
95. Id.
96. The Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 78, at part 1, § 1(5)(b).
97. See generally Introduction to the Human Rights Committee,
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/a/introhrc.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).
98. Duncan Campbell, Labour Warned over Limits to Free Expression, GUARDIAN,




obligations to combat terrorism, on the one hand, and to protect
expression on the other.
III. COMPARATIVE COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1624
While both the United States and the United Kingdom have
come under fire from international and domestic human rights groups
for their newly-enacted or fortified counterterrorism legislation, these
measures may not pose as much of a threat to individual liberties as
these groups feared.100 The fact remains that even with these laws
both the United States and United Kingdom have had enormous
difficulty in prosecuting terrorist use of the Internet. 10 1
A. The United States' Compliance with UNSCR 1624
Despite powerful rhetoric surrounding the War on Terror
launched in the wake of September 11th, 10 2 the U.S. government's
efforts to identify and prosecute terrorists may have been less
successful than authorities have otherwise suggested. 03 In a recent
press release, for example, the Justice Department cited the fact that
"there has not been another terrorist attack on American soil in the
past seven years" as evidence of its success in prosecuting terrorists.10 4
The Justice Department attributed some of this success to its policy of
taking action against terror threats at the earliest stage possible or
"as soon as the law, evidence, and unique circumstances of each case
permit, using any charge available."10 5 This approach also explains
why the material support statutes have played such a critical role in
the government's overall prosecutorial efforts, "allowing prosecutors to
target the provision of support, resources and other assistance to
terrorists and to intervene during early stages of terrorist
planning." 06
100. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
101. Id.
102. I use 'Var on Terror" here to refer to the American response to the attacks of
September 11, 2001, including subsequent diplomatic, military, financial, investigative,
homeland security, and humanitarian actions and efforts. See Glossary, available at
http://2008election.procon.org/viewresource.asp?resourceID=1575 (last visited Feb. 18,
2009).
103. See infra Part. III.A.
104. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Justice Department Counter-
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As a consequence of turning to lesser charges when there may
be insufficient evidence to prove more serious crimes relating to
terrorism, 10 7 the United States is experiencing difficulty prosecuting
incitement and may also be failing to comply with UNSCR 1624.108
Although federal terrorism investigations have named nearly 400
suspects since September 11th, only 39 of these suspects have been
convicted of crimes related to terrorism or national security, and even
fewer have been convicted on material support charges. 0 9 Despite
these statistics, the government continues to assert the importance of
the material support statutes, describing them as forming "a critical
component of the [Justice] Department's overall terrorist prosecutorial
efforts."" 0 But what has been the effect of these statutes in practice,
especially with regard to combating incitement?
1. The Prosecution of Sami Omar Al-Hussayen:
Constitutionally Protected Speech or Material Support?
Take, for example, the much-publicized case of Sami Omar Al-
Hussayen, a thirty-four year old graduate student at the University of
Idaho who was charged with three counts of providing and conspiring
to provide material support for terrorism in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
2339A and 2339B, as well as with several additional non-terrorism-
related charges.111 For some, Al-Hussayen's case represented the
government's first attempt to use the material support statutes to
prosecute conduct that consisted almost exclusively of operating and
maintaining websites. 112 According to one scholar, A-Hussayen's case
"attracted national attention and triggered a heated debate focused
mainly on one key question: were A1-Hussayen's Internet activities
constitutionally protected 'free speech' or did they cross the line into
criminal and material support to terrorism?"'
13
107. Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on
Terrorism Charges, WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at AO1.
108. S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 15, at preamble.
109. Eggen & Tate, supra note 107. Note that this list does not include terrorism
suspects held at Guantanamo Bay. Id. The median sentence for those convicted was just
eleven months, and the most common convictions were on charges of fraud, making false
statements, passport violations, and conspiracy. Id.
110. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Justice Department Counter-
Terrorism Efforts Since 9/11, supra note 104.
111. United States v. AI-Hussayen, Case No: CR03-048-C-EJL, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29793, at **1-3 (D. Idaho Apr. 6, 2004).
112. Alan F. Williams, Prosecuting Website Development Under the Material Support





In its indictment, the Justice Department alleged that Al-
Hussayen "unlawfully provided to terrorists and terrorist
organizations, directly and indirectly, expert advice and assistance,
[as well as] communications equipment . . . [by] creating and
maintaining Internet websites and other Internet media designed to
recruit mujahideen"1 4 and raise funds for violent jihad in Israel,
Chechnya, and other places."'115 The indictment alleged that because
Al-Hussayen "exercised significant control over the operation and
content of those websites and other Internet media" he both knew and
intended that "the websites and other Internet media he helped
create, operate, and maintain through his expert advice or assistance
would be and were used to support and justify violent jihad."
116
Al-Hussayen moved to dismiss the terrorism-related charges on
three grounds." 7 First, he argued that the indictment failed to allege
that he provided anything prohibited by the material support statutes
and sought to impose criminal liability for merely "using his personal
knowledge to create and maintain websites which were merely used to
publish speech."'18  Second, he argued that "simply creating or
maintaining or using websites in the 'virtual space' of the Internet did
not constitute providing 'communications equipment"' within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2339.119 Finally, he argued that "the
advocating of one's beliefs is not criminal nor is such advocacy in the
hope of encouraging others to donate money a violation of the
applicable statutes."12 In denying A1-Hussayen's motion to dismiss,
the district court held that "[t]he indictment allege[d] more than that
the defendant was simply a passive party who created and used
certain websites; instead, the indictment charge[d] that his
involvement included providing support and resources . . . with the
knowledge and intent to support terrorism."'121
Before his trial began, A1-Hussayen's defense counsel filed
motions arguing that the First Amendment foreclosed prosecution of
Al-Hussayen's Internet activities because such prosecution would
114. 'Mujahideen" refers to Muslim guerilla warriors engaged in "jihad" or holy war.
http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=mujahideen (last visited March 9, 2009).
115. Second Superseding Indictment 1, Al-Hussayen, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29793. available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism
/usalhussyn304sind2.pdf.
116. Id. 11.
117. See Al-Hussayen, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29793, at **1-2.
118. Id. at *3.
119. Id. at *5.
120. Id. at *8.
121. Id. at *9.
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violate his rights to freedom of association and freedom of speech. 122
The defense team conceded the underlying facts set forth by the
government but argued that his acts were protected by the First
Amendment. 123 A federal jury later acquitted A1-Hussayen of all three
terrorism charges 124 due to their feeling that the government had
failed to make a connection between the websites at issue and any
wrongdoing by Al-Hussayen.125 Although Al-Hussayen ultimately
agreed to deportation in exchange for the prosecution dropping the
remaining visa and false statement charges, 26 some members of the
media viewed his acquittal as a defeat of the Patriot Act's enhanced
material support provisions, including the "expert advice or
assistance" provision. 127  Others believed that Al-Hussayen's case
demonstrated the unsuitability of the material support statutes for
the prosecution of incitement to terrorism because such prosecutions
raise substantial constitutional questions. 28  For example, the
material support statutes may not give "adequate notice that website
creation and maintenance might expose one to criminal liability."'
29
Furthermore, around the time of Al-Hussayen's prosecution, the
material support statutes were coming under additional scrutiny for
their constitutionally questionable vagueness.
1 30
2. Humanitarian Law Project & the Erosion of Enhanced Material
Support Provisions of the Patriot Act
Just months before Al-Hussayen was charged with providing
material support to terrorists in the form of "expert advice or
122. Williams, supra note 112, at 377.
123. Id.
124. United States v. Al-Hussayen, No. CR03-048-C-EJL (D. Idaho June 10, 2004).
125. Richard B. Schmitt, Acquittal in Internet Terrorism Case is a Defeat for Patriot
Act, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at A-20. One juror was quoted as saying, "The evidence was
not exact . . . [and] a lot was left up in the air." Id.; see also Williams, supra note 112, at
378 (noting that a member of the jury stated, "There was no clear cut evidence that said he
was a terrorist, so it was all on inference.").
126. Betsy Z. Russell, Sami Al-Hussayen on his way Home, SPOKESMAN REV., July
22, 2004.
127. Dan Collins, Court Test for Patriot Act: Saudi Student Accused of Using
Computer to Aid Terror Groups, CBS.COM, Apr. 14, 2004, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/17/national/main6l2418.shtml?source=search-sto
ry; see also Todd Wilkinson, Boise Terror Case Tests Patriot Act's Reach, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 22, 2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0422/pO3sO1-
usju.html.
128. See Williams, supra note 112, at 366.
129. See id. at 380 (citing United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 358
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
130. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
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assistance," the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California ruled that the term "expert advice or assistance" in the
material support statute was impermissibly vague and thus void
under the Constitution.13 1 Though the decision of the California court
was not binding in Idaho, where A-Hussayen was tried, the ruling
was nevertheless persuasive authority that drew a lot of attention to
Al-Hussayen's case.1 32 The suit was brought by the Humanitarian
Law Project (HLP),133 which has been waging a nearly decade-long
battle against the federal government over the constitutionality of
various counterterrorism measures and statutes.134  It has filed
numerous suits seeking declaratory judgments that provisions of the
Patriot Act are vague and overbroad, in violation of constitutional free
speech, free association, and due process protections. 135 Through
litigation, HLP has been slowly chipping away at one of the
government's only powerful tools for prosecuting incitement: the
material support statutes.
136
Even before the Patriot Act broadened the reach of these
statutes, HLP challenged the constitutionality of criminal prohibitions
on the supply of "material support and resources" to alleged terrorists
and terrorist groups. 137 In Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, HLP
challenged the constitutionality of certain types of support prohibited
by the material support statutes, including "training" and
"personnel."' 38  The U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California ruled in favor of HLP, holding that the terms "training" and
"personnel" were impermissibly vague because they appeared to
prohibit activities protected by the First Amendment, such as
131. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1187 (C.D. Cal.
2004).
132. Since the court struck down the "expert advice or assistance" provision with
which Al-Hussayen was being charged, some characterized the law as "shaky at best," and
looked to Al-Hussayen's case as another test of the validity of certain Patriot Act
provisions. Collins, supra note 127.
133. HLP is a non-profit organization with consultative status at the United Nations
that describes itself as "dedicated to protecting human rights and promoting the peaceful
resolution of conflict by using established international human rights laws and
humanitarian law." Humanitarian Law Project, http://hlp.home.igc.org/ (last visited Mar.
16, 2009).
134. Andrew C. McCarthy, Federal Judge Intrudes Upon Executive Authority to




136. 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A), (B) (2000).
137. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
138. Id. at 1204.
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"distributing literature and information and training others to engage
in advocacy.
'139
After its success in Reno, HLP filed another suit in the same
district challenging the prohibition on providing "expert advice or
assistance" in the material support statutes as both unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. 140 The plaintiffs, represented by HLP, sought to
provide various kinds of support to two groups, the Kurdistan
Workers' Party and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, both of
which had been designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the
secretary of state.141 The plaintiffs sought to provide training and
written publications on how to engage in political advocacy, medical
advice and assistance, and expertise in information technology and
software development. 142 The district court held that the term "expert
advice or assistance" was impermissibly vague because it 'could be
construed to include unequivocally pure speech and advocacy
protected by the First Amendment' or to 'encompass First Amendment
protected activities."'
1 43
After HLP litigation began chipping away at the material
support statutes, Congress responded by amending and clarifying
these statutes.1 44 In December 2004 Congress enacted the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), amending the
definition of "material support or resources" and attempting to clarify
some of the terms invalidated through previous HLP litigation. 145 In
the IRTPA, Congress defined "training" as "instruction or teaching
designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general
knowledge."1 46 It defined "personnel" to include individuals who "work
under [a] terrorist organization's direction or control" or "organize,
manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of [the]
organization."1 47 It also defined "expert advice or assistance" to mean
"advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge."1 48 These revisions were enough for the U.S.
139. Id.
140. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1187 (C.D. Cal.
2004).
141. Id. at 1188.
142. Id. at 1189-92.
143. Id. at 1201 (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d
382, 404 (9th Cir. 2003)).
144. See infra text accompanying notes 145-48.
145. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
§ 6603(b)(2), 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2000)).
146. Id. § 6603(0 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000)).
147. Id.
148. 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(3) (2000) (reflecting the amendments).
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to vacate the district court's
ruling in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno that the terms "training"
and "personnel" were unconstitutionally overbroad. 149  But these
definitional changes did not settle other challenges and HLP
continued to pursue litigation over the material support statutes, even
as amended by the IRTPA.' 50
In Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, the Ninth Circuit
reevaluated the terms "training," "expert advice or assistance,"
"service," and "personnel" in light of IRTPA's revisions.1 51 The court
held that the term "training" was still impermissibly vague because it
"could still be read to encompass speech and advocacy protected by the
First Amendment .. .and imposes criminal sanctions of up to fifteen
years imprisonment without sufficiently defining the prohibited
conduct for ordinary people to understand."1 5 2  The court also
determined that the term "expert advice or assistance" remained
impermissibly vague because the amended definition included "'other
specialized knowledge,' which covers every conceivable subject" and
continued to cover constitutionally protected advocacy.15 3 Finally, the
court held that the term "service" was still impermissibly vague
because "the statute defines 'service' to include 'training' or 'expert
advice or assistance' and because 'it is easy to imagine protected
expression that falls within the bounds' of the term 'service." ' 15 4 The
court did, however, accept IRTPA's revision of the term "personnel" as
curing any vagueness because it provided "fair notice of prohibited
conduct ... and no longer punishe[d] protected speech."
155
Post-Mukasey, in order to prosecute material support in the
Ninth Circuit, the government cannot rely on characterizing such
support as the provision of "training," "service," or "expert advice or
assistance."156 Of course, the decision still leaves the government with
other laws to combat the terrorist use of the Internet, including those
dealing with "communications equipment" or "other physical
assets."1 57 The main lesson to take away from the HLP and other
149. 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1204 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
150. See infra text accompanying notes 151-55.
151. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1135-37 (9th Cir. 2007).
152. Id. at 1134-35.
153. Id. at 1135.
154. Id. at 1136 (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d
1134, 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
155. Mukasey, 509 F.3d at 1136.
156. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a), A(b) (2000).
157. Id.
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similar litigation is clear: the material support statutes cannot be used
to prosecute actions protected by the First Amendment. 158
3. Where U.S. Anti-Terror Law Stands Today
A resolution in the now-pending case of Babar Ahmad may
eventually settle some of the issues surrounding the government's
ability to prosecute suspected terrorists under the material support
statutes without infringing on First Amendment rights. 15 9 Babar
Ahmad, a resident of the United Kingdom who has never been to the
United States, is facing extradition to the United States, having been
indicted in 2004 on charges of providing, and conspiring to provide,
material support to terrorists in connection with Azzam Publications
and its family of websites (collectively, Azzam). 160 Azzam is an entity
based in the United Kingdom established and operated to recruit
individuals to become mujahedeen and to solicit and raise funds for
jihad.16' The indictment against Babar Ahmad alleged that he
"provided, through the creation and use of various Internet websites,
email communication, and other means, expert advice and assistance,
communications equipment. . . and personnel designed to recruit and
assist the Chechen mujahideen and the Taliban, and raise funds for
violent jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and other places."'162 The
United States claimed it had jurisdiction over the case based on the
fact that Ahmad operated Azzam's websites through American-based
Internet service providers (ISPs) located in Connecticut, Nevada, and
elsewhere. 163
Given Azzam's clear self-proclaimed purpose on its website to
"propagate the call for jihad, among the Muslims who are sitting
down, ignorant of this vital duty . . . to 'incite the believers' and also
secondly to raise some money for the brothers,"'164 Ahmad's connection
to these websites would likely be more successfully prosecuted under
the United Kingdom's robust anti-terror legislation than under U.S.
law.165 Thus, Ahmad's case has prompted many people to ask why he
158. Broader Law Sought Against 'Material Support' for Terrorism, FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER, May 6, 2004, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org
/news. aspx?id= 13306.
159. See Conway, supra note 3, at 10.
160. Indictment 10-11, United States v. Ahmad (2004).
161. Id.
162. Id. 1.
163. Aff. in Support of Request for Extradition of Babar Ahmad, United States v.
Ahmad, No. 3:04M240 (WIG) (D. Conn. 2004).
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., The Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 78.
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is facing extradition to the United States instead of being prosecuted
in the United Kingdom. One member of Parliament has already
raised suspicion in this regard, stating, "The allegations are that
Babar Ahmad committed these offences whilst in the [United
Kingdom], whilst a British citizen, and whilst in London .... If that
be the case the obvious question is why can't and why shouldn't he be
tried in the [United Kingdom]?" 166 Although this question remains to
be answered, an analysis of the United Kingdom's track record in
terrorist prosecutions may shed some light on the issue.
B. The United Kingdom's Compliance with UNSCR 1624
Although the United Kingdom's enhanced anti-terror laws
under the Terrorism Act 2006 have already come under fire from
groups like Human Rights Watch for being overly aggressive and
having a potentially chilling effect on the freedom of expression, there
are no documented effects of the Act to date. 167 Thus, one can only
speculate on the impact of the Terrorism Act 2006 based on the
relative effectiveness of the Terrorism Act 2000. The Terrorism Act
2000 has not been as effective or threatening as supposed at the time
of its enacted. Of the more than 1,200 suspected terrorists arrested in
the United Kingdom between September 11, 2001, and March 31,
2007, 1,165 of them were arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000.168
Of the 1,165 suspects arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000, only 41
have been convicted, and more than half have been released without
any charges. 169 Examination of the cases of Younes Tsouli, Samina
Malik, and others may provide some insight into the reasons for the
United Kingdom's less-than-impressive track record on prosecuting
terrorist use of the Internet.
166. Sam Knight, 'Jihadist' Computer Expert Cleared for Extradition to US, TIMES
(U.K.), Nov. 16, 2005, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk
/article590795.ece.
167. See 1,166 Anti-Terror Arrests Net 40 Convictions, GUARDIAN, Mar. 5, 2007,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2O07/mar/O5/politics.terrorism. The Home Office
has yet to provide any figures for terror arrests under the Terrorism Act 2006, which
introduced a range of new offenses. Id. Moreover, since terrorism prosecutions often take
years to complete, accounting for the time it may take the government to collect and gather
evidence and to prosecute the case while remaining sensitive to national security concerns,
it may be several more years before we know how the Terrorism Act 2006 will effect
terrorist prosecutions. Id.
168. Terrorism and the Law: Home Office, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uklsecurity
/terrorism-and-the-law/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).
169. Id.
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1. Younes Tsouli: Terrorist 007
In July 2007, more than seven years after the Terrorism Act
2000 criminalized incitement of terrorism, Younes Tsouli, Waseem
Mughal, and Tariq Al-Daour became the first men in Britain to plead
guilty to inciting murder for terrorist purposes under the Terrorism
Act 2000.170 The prosecution alleged that these men were "concerned
in the purchase, construction, and maintenance of a large number of
websites and Internet chat forums on which material was published
which incited acts of terrorist murder, primarily in Iraq."'171 The
government further alleged that "the material on the websites
included assertions that it was the duty of Muslims to fight armed
jihad against Jews, crusaders, apostates, and their supporters in all
Muslim countries and that it was the duty of every Muslim to fight
and kill them wherever they are, civilian or military."'172
The judge found that "the websites created by Tsouli were used
as a vehicle on which jihadi materials were uploaded, which incited
acts of terrorist murder outside the United Kingdom in Iraq" but that
"Tsouli's skill lay in the setting up of the websites, 173 [leaving] others
to post or upload the material."'174 Tsouli was ultimately sentenced to
sixteen years in prison. 175 Although Tsouli was convicted of crimes
predating the Terrorism Act 2006, the judge found that "some of this
material might in future cases properly found a prosecution under
those sections of the Terrorism Act 2006 which prohibits conduct
which indirectly encourages or glorifies terrorism."'176 Thus, at least in
Tsouli's case, it is unclear whether the differences between the 2000
and 2006 acts were significant in chilling free expression in the United
Kingdom.
170. Press Release, Crown Prosecution Serv., Three Men Admit Using Internet to
Incite Terrorism in First British Case (July 5, 2007), available at
http://www.cps.gov.uklnews/pressreleases/archive/2007/137_07.html. Under the Terrorism
Act 2000, it is a crime to incite another to commit an act of terrorism, wholly or partly,
outside the United Kingdom if the act would constitute certain offenses, including murder,
if committed in England or Wales. The Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 78 § 59.
171. R v. Tsouli, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3300,1 5 (Eng.).
172. Id.
173. This is something akin to the "expert advice or assistance" prohibited by the
material support statutes in the United States. See supra text accompanying notes114-16
and 148.
174. Tsouli, [2007] EWCA T 13, 15.
175. See Gordon Corera, Al-Qaeda's 007, THE TIMES (U.K.), Jan. 16, 2008, available
at http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/lifeand-style/women/the way we live
/article3191517.ece (last visited March 9, 2009). Although he was originally sentenced to
eleven years, the court of appeals increased his sentence to sixteen years after the solicitor
general referred his sentence as unduly lenient. Id.
176. Tsouli, [2007] EWCA 24.
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2. The Lyrical Terrorist and Possession of Internet Documents
Just as the Al-Hussayen case was characterized as a key test of
the Patriot Act in the United States, the case of Samina Malik was
similarly viewed as a key test of the United Kingdom's terrorism
acts. 177 On November 8, 2007, Malik became the first woman to be
convicted of a terrorism offense in Britain 178 when she was convicted
of "possessing information of a kind likely to be useful to a person
committing or preparing an act of terrorism," contrary to Section 58 of
the Terrorism Act 2000.179 Malik was found to be in possession of a
number of documents downloaded from the Internet and saved on her
hard drive that appeared to support violent jihad, including The
Terrorist's Handbook, The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook, and
operators' manuals for various firearms. 80 She was also in possession
of a collection of graphic and violent poems authored under the pen
name "The Lyrical Terrorist," including poems about killing non-
believers, pursuing martyrdom, and raising children to be holy
fighters.' 8 ' Malik admitted that she was inspired to write her poetry
when, "through her use of the Internet[,] she came under the influence
of Abu Hamza al-Masri."'18
2
Despite the government's assurances that "Malik was not
prosecuted for her poetry ... [but] for possessing documents that could
provide practical assistance to terrorists,"' 3 her case sparked
immense public outrage. 8 4 Muhammed Abdul Bari, the secretary
general of the Muslim Council of Britain, condemned the
criminalization of such activities, stating, "Many young people
download objectionable material from the Internet, but it seems if you
177. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13. Both cases were characterized as
the furthest encroachment of anti-terror laws on individual liberties. Id.
178. Duncan Gardham, 'Lyrical Terrorist' Samina Malik Found Guilty, TELEGRAPH
(U.K.), Nov. 9, 2007, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1568726
/'Lyrical-Terrorist'-Samina-Malik-guilty.html.
179. Regina v. Malik, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1450, 1.
180. Joshua Rozenberg, Wicked Thoughts are not a Crime-Yet, TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
Sept. 7, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uklnews/newstopics/lawreports
/joshuarozenberg/2153626/Law-Wicked-thoughts-are-not-a-crime-andndash-yet.html.
181. Gardham, supra note 178.
182. Regina, [2008] EWCA 15.
183. Press Release, Crown Prosecution Serv., CPS Response to Samina Malik
Appeal (June 17, 2008), available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/news
/pressreleases/143_08.html.
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are Muslim then this could lead to criminal charges, even if you have
absolutely no intention to do harm to anyone else."
18 5
The court of appeal reviewing Malik's conviction focused on the
question of intention in quashing her conviction in light of subsequent
judgments of the court.186 The judge pointed to Regina v. K, where the
court held that a document only falls within Section 58 of the
Terrorism Act 2000 "if it is of a kind that is likely to provide practical
assistance to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism."187
In light of Regina v. K, the court determined that Malik's conviction
was "unsafe," from the perspective of justice, because there was "a
very real danger that the jury became confused."1 88 To prevent further
confusion, the court elucidated a new requirement-that the suspect
must have a clear intent to engage in terrorism. 189 Just as U.S. courts
have pared down the robust counterterrorism legislation used to
combat terrorist use of the Internet, so too have U.K. courts limited
the applicability of aggressive anti-terror laws. Thus, it is not clear
that the Terrorism Act 2006 has done anything to enhance
prosecutions of incitement as compared to the Terrorism Act 2000.
IV. HOW THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM CAN
COMPLY WITH UNSCR 1624
Even if U.S. counterterrorism measures and U.K. anti-terror
legislation have not been nearly potent enough to impermissibly
infringe on individuals' civil liberties,1 90 they still pose significant
problems for each state. For one thing, it seems that legislatures and
law enforcement agencies in both states are working hard to prevent
terror within domestic legal systems that, in general, do not recognize
preemptive action as legitimate.1 91 However, if the domestic laws of
states parties to UNSCR 1624 are ineffective at preventing incitement
to terrorism, then those states are failing to comply with their
185. Natalie Paris et al., Female 'Lyrical Terrorist' Escapes Jail, TELEGRAPH, Dec. 7,
2007, (U.K.) available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/labour
/1571675/Female-lyrical-terrorist-escapes-jail.html.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 187-89.
187. Regina v. K, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 185; Regina v. K, [2008] 3 All E.R. 526.
188. Regina v. Malik, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1450, 43.
189. Id.
190. See supra Part III.
191. See Joanne Mariner, Terrorism and Speech, FINDLAW, Jan. 28, 2008,
http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/mariner/20080128.html. Mariner argues that "[b]y wasting
scarce legal and prosecutorial resources going after speech, rather than action,
governments may be doing more harm than good. The defendants in such cases no doubt
see them as political and religious persecution, and their families, neighbors, and larger
communities may agree." Id.
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international legal obligations under the resolution. 192
Noncompliance, in turn, undermines the credibility of the
international legal framework specifically designed to combat the
problem of terrorist use of the Internet. Several solutions have been
proposed to remedy the gaps in the current scheme for combating
incitement, including ways to improve both domestic and
international efforts to combat terrorist use of the Internet. 193
A. Fixing the Domestic System for Prosecuting Incitement
1. Better Utilization of Existing Laws
The most obvious potential solution, for the benefit both the
United States and the United Kingdom's domestic legal systems,
involves more creative prosecutorial maneuvering. 194 That is, the
prosecution should shift its reliance on statutes that fail to produce
convictions to ones that would more successfully hold terrorists
accountable. For example, as discussed at length in this Note, the
U.S. government has relied heavily on material support statutes to
prosecute terrorist use of the Internet, such as in the case of Al-
Hussayen. 195 U.S. prosecutors may have more success if they rely less
upon material support statutes and more on other sections of the U.S.
code. 196 One such alternative basis for prosecution is the federal
criminal solicitation statute,197 which allows U.S. authorities to
prosecute individuals who solicit, command, induce, or otherwise
endeavor to persuade others to engage in felonious conduct with the
intent that the others engage in such conduct. 98 Although the
element of intent required for the free-standing offense of federal
criminal solicitation may be a considerable hurdle to overcome,
terrorist use of the Internet has unique qualities that would likely
provide the evidence for such intent. For example, whether a website
is password protected, whether text is accompanied by violent and
provocative imagery, and whether the website is affiliated with a
registered terrorist organization, 199 are a few factors that the
192. S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 15.
193. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1-2.
194. See discussion infra Part V.A.1.
195. See supra Part III.A.1.
196. See infra text accompanying notes 197-205.
197. 18 U.S.C. § 373 (2000); see supra Part II.A.2.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 54.
199. By "registered terrorist organization," I am referring to foreign terrorist
organizations (FTOs), which are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary
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prosecution may use to deduce intent to solicit felonious conduct. 200 Of
course, there is no guarantee that the federal criminal solicitation
statute will escape judicial erosion of a kind applied to the material
support statutes.201 Moreover, the same reasoning might well apply to
heightened reliance on the criminal sedition or seditious conspiracy
statutes.
202
Another potential basis for prosecution might be the use of non-
terrorism-specific statutes to charge terrorism defendants. 203 These
alternative statutes might include immigration violations like visa
fraud, providing false statements, credit card fraud, money
laundering, and other similar charges.20 4 In some instances, the
government's failure to lodge these alternative charges against the
defendant may have accounted for its failure to convict.205 In other
cases, where such alternative charges have been lodged against
terrorist defendants, as in the pending case of Babar Ahmad, 20 6 the
result has been a conviction on the alternative charges and acquittal
on the more serious terrorism-related charges.207 Therefore, at least
one major problem with this approach is that, just as the material
support statutes have proved insufficiently weak to match the gravity
of certain terrorist offenses, so might these alternative statutes
produce sentences that are unduly lenient or otherwise ill-suited to
the crimes charged. 208
2. The Creation of New Internet-Specific Laws
Another proposal to strengthen the domestic legal systems of
the United States and the United Kingdom advocates for the creation
of Internet-specific legislation to deal with the unique threat posed by
of State and identified as threatening the security of U.S. nationals or national security.
See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet (2005),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm (last visited March 9, 2009).
200. See generally Williams, supra note 112.
201. See supra Part III.A.2.
202. Id.
203. See infra text accompanying notes 204-08.
204. Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting
Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, May 2008, at 6, available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf.
205. Indictment at 7-14, United States v. Ahsan, No. 06-cr-00194 (D. Conn.
2006). The indictment alleges three counts of terrorism-related charges but fails to charge
Ahsan with any alternative crimes. See id.
206. Indictment TT 10-11, United States v. Ahmad (2004). Count four of the
indictment charges Ahmad with money laundering. Id.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 160-62 and 165.
208. See Eggen & Tate, supra note 107; see also text accompanying note 109.
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terrorist use of the Internet. 2 9 For example, one scholar proposes the
enactment of a statute called "Use of Internet Websites with Specific
Intent to Facilitate Terrorism," which would subject to criminal
prosecution anyone who "[e]stablishes and maintains Internet
websites or posts detailed information on such websites with the
specific intent to recruit persons to join terrorist organizations" or
"with the specific intent to encourage violent attacks against the
United States government or its citizens, [including, but not limited
to], violations of those [U.S.] code sections set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
2339A(a)." 210 Since this statute imposes criminal liability on anyone
who "establishes and maintains" such sites, the statute criminalizes
behavior as opposed to pure speech or advocacy. Moreover, the
proposed statute would include a limitation in order to protect non-
violent political speech or advocacy- namely, "[a]dvocacy of peaceful
change and criticism of United States officials or United States policy
is specifically excluded."
21'1
The creation of Internet-specific legislation would have three
potential advantages over existing laws. First, creating a separate
prosecutorial tool for terrorist use of the Internet would prevent the
government from expanding the reach of existing law "beyond the
ambit of the activity that they were designed to proscribe." 212 For
example, in the United States, prosecuting terrorist use of the
Internet under Internet-specific legislation, as opposed to traditional
material support statutes, would create the added benefit of protecting
the legitimacy of existing laws from constitutionally impermissible
manipulation for the purpose of terrorist prosecutions. Secondly,
Internet-specific legislation would "provide notice and specificity to
the public,"213 which would also work to enhance the legitimacy of
such laws. Finally, separate Internet-specific laws may shift
evidentiary burdens in a way that would enhance the prosecution's
ability to convict. 214 Proponents of the creation of a special federal
court to deal specifically with terrorism prosecution often invoke these
same arguments-enhanced legitimacy, improved notice, and
favorable burden-shifting. 215 Unsurprisingly, the counterarguments to
209. See Williams, supra note 112, at 383.
210. Id. at 383-84 (emphasis added).
211. Id. at 384.
212. Id.
213. Williams, supra note 112, at 384.
214. See generally id. at 384-85.
215. See Workable Terrorism Trials, WASH. POST, July 27, 2008, at B06.
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a special court are analogous to the reasons one might oppose
Internet-specific legislation.
216
The most significant problem in creating a new set of laws is
that a primary goal of terrorism prosecutions is the prevention of
terrorism. The creation of new Internet-specific laws, or any other
new system of prosecution, would require the creation of new
procedures and precedents to govern the application of such laws.
217
This would impose immense inefficiency on terrorism prosecution,
which is inherently of a time-sensitive and urgent nature.
218
Moreover, it would ignore the fact that "federal courts have amassed
many years of experience and a reservoir of judicial wisdom as well as
a broadly experienced bar" to navigate the inherent complications
posed by the prosecution of international terrorism cases.219 Rather
than enhancing the legitimacy of the system, the creation of separate
or parallel laws might undermine the integrity of the American legal
system, at least initially, if adequate mechanisms are not in place to
ensure fairness and due process.220 It is not clear that the question of
notice would be resolved through Internet-specific legislation so long
as the First Amendment remains in place to exempt protected
speech. 221  Even with proposed limitations in place, 222 including
exceptions for "advocacy for peaceful change," the terms implicated
would remain vague-maybe even unconstitutionally vague.
223
Perhaps for these reasons, the creation of increasingly specific
legislation has not worked for the United Kingdom.
224
All in all, the risks in creating an entirely new framework to
deal with an urgent matter of national security are too great.
Therefore, rather than creating new laws, each state should use its
existing laws to increase the efficiency and accuracy of terrorist
prosecutions. Not only is the creative utilization of existing laws, as a
practical matter, easier than the promulgation of new ones, there is
concrete proof that existing laws can be successfully applied to
216. See infra text accompanying notes 217-23.
217. See generally Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 204, at 61-128.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
219. Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 204, at 3.
220. Id.
221. See supra Part II.A.1.
222. See supra text accompanying note 211.
223. See supra Part III.A.2.
224. See supra Part III.B.2. The United Kingdom has already tried a similar
approach, with the creation of new offenses including encouragement and the possession of
documents, including Internet documents, of a kind likely to be of practical assistance to
terrorists. Id. This increasingly specific anti-terror legislation has done little to increase
convictions from the enactment of the Terrorism Act 2000 to the Terrorism Act 2006. Id.
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important terrorist prosecutions, as they were in the case of Sheik
Rahman.225 In addition, in order to protect the legitimacy of our
domestic legal system, it may be that we want to maintain a hefty
burden of proof on the government when it prosecutes individuals for
inchoate offenses. 22
6
B. The Need for an Improved International System to
Combat Incitement
1. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
Creative manipulation of existing laws, or even the creation of
Internet-specific legislation, will be insufficient to combat terrorist use
of the Internet and to bring states into compliance with UNSCR
1624.227 An international solution is necessary and should take the
form of a treaty that better allocates individual states' responsibilities
for preventing and prosecuting terrorist use of the Internet for
purposes of incitement. To borrow from the discipline of international
environmental law, the signatories of UNSCR 1624 should draft a new
agreement based on the principle of "common but differentiated
responsibilities." 228
In international environmental law, the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities derives from the recognition that
certain complex trans-boundary environmental problems, like climate
change, require cooperation on an international level. 229 The principle
has two components: (1) the common responsibility of states for the
protection of the environment at the national and international level,
and (2) the need to take into account each state's contributions and
ability to prevent, reduce, and control the problem.230 Terrorist use of
the Internet is also a trans-boundary problem because the domestic
regulations of one country, by themselves, can do little to combat
incitement to terrorism on the Internet. 231 Thus, a common but
differentiated strategy for combating incitement might also have two
components: (1) a recognition of the common responsibility of all states
to prevent incitement to terrorism on the Internet, and (2) the need to
225. See supra text accompanying notes 65-70.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
227. See generally, S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 15, at preamble.
228. See Paul G. Harris, Common but Differentiated Responsibility: the Kyoto
Protocol and United States Policy, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 27, 28-30 (1999).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 29-30.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
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exploit each state's comparative legal advantages in crafting a
solution. Rather than simply calling upon all states to take identical
measures, such as suppressing the financing of terrorism 232 or
prohibiting incitement by law, 233 a common but differentiated solution
would allocate responsibilities according to specific domestic legal
considerations of each state.
234
The starting point for drafting such an agreement will be to
identify the comparative legal advantages of each domestic legal
system. For example, with respect to the United Kingdom,
comparative legal advantages in combating incitement include the
lack of a constitution-and therefore constitutionally imposed limits
on regulation of private activity-as well as a strategic position within
the greater European legal community. 235 With these advantages in
mind, a common but differentiated agreement might call upon U.K.
authorities to increase monitoring and surveillance activities or to
develop filters to remove terrorism-related content from the web or to
deny access to terrorist websites through ISP filtering systems. 236
ISPs in the United Kingdom already cooperate with law enforcement
to shut down sites with illegal content, including sites containing child
pornography. 237 There are signs of political will to replicate this
cooperation with respect to terrorist content. 238 In her first high
profile speech on combating terrorism, Jacqui Smith, the United
Kingdom's new home secretary, stated, "If we are ready and willing to
take action to stop the grooming of the vulnerable young on social
networking sites, then I believe we should also take action against
those who groom vulnerable people for the purposes of violent
extremism."'239  Even if the operators of these sites move their
232. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 16, at preamble.
233. S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 15, at preamble.
234. Id. 1(a).
235. The U.K. is party to a number of European-wide legal instruments addressing
terrorism. See, e.g., Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 3,
2005, C.E.T.S. 196. The convention's stated purpose is to
enhance the efforts of the Parties in preventing terrorism and its negative effects
on the full enjoyment of human rights, in particular the right to life, both by
measures to be taken at national level and through international cooperation,
with due regard to the existing applicable multilateral or bilateral treaties or
agreements between the parties.
Id. at 1 1-2.
236. See Mark Trevelyan, UK Seeks Ways to Stop Militant Grooming on Web,







operations elsewhere, the effect, at least in Britain, may be
substantial.
Because of the stringent First Amendment limitations in place
in the United States, an international agreement based on common
but differentiated responsibilities would obligate to the United States
to cooperate in a way that minimizes the importance of government
regulation and emphasizes the role of private actors. For example, the
government might find a way to incentivize the creators and operators
of search engines to adjust search capabilities in such a way as to
complicate access to terrorist websites. For example, a search engine
might provide "an indication of the status of information according to
measureable reputability dynamics" so as to push actual terrorist
websites down to the bottom of a user's search results.240 The same
agreement could exploit the United States' high level of technical
sophistication relating to private Internet regulation. Ultimately, "the
successful use of the Internet for recruitment and other types of
political action is based on the assumption that both users and
audiences have access to the messages communicated via the
Internet."
241
Another viable option that does not involve government
regulation involves what at least one author has dubbed "cultural
intelligence"-empowering moderate voices to challenge radicals on
the Internet.242 According to this approach, the best way to counter
radicalization on the Internet is to offer counterarguments and to
refute the underlying assumptions that promote and incite
terrorism.243 Whereas censorship or filtering would only put a Band-
Aid on the problem, the cultural intelligence approach has two effects.
First, disseminating more counterterrorism viewpoints on the web will
affect the technical operation of web searches, as the same key words
used to locate pro-terrorism sites might bring up alternative
counterterrorism pages. Second, and more importantly, the cultural
intelligence approach has the advantage of addressing some of the
underlying ideological roots of radicalism and terrorism.24
4
Ultimately, the integration of these state-specific measures as part of
240. See Conway, supra note 3, at 6. This is basically just a technique by which the
most reputable sites rise to the top of a user's search results. Id.
241. Id.
242. Johnny Ryan, Dossier Security and Defense: EU Must Take its Anti-terrorism
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a larger, enforceable global counterterrorism strategy is vital to
combating terrorist use of the Internet and to promoting global
security.
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet represents a new and rapidly growing front of the
war against international terrorism.245 Terrorists are increasingly
using the Internet to incite others to join terrorist causes and to
support or commit acts of terrorism.246 Because of the cross-border
nature of terrorist use of the Internet, governments have realized the
need for, and have taken some concrete steps towards international
cooperation, including the adoption of UNSCR 1373 and UNSCR
1624.247 These documents reflect a renewed political will to combat
terrorism, in all of its forms, while recognizing the existence of
countervailing values, including the freedom of expression.
248
Governments have also responded by revising existing domestic laws
and propagating new laws. 249
The United Kingdom and the United States have come under
increasing fire for their seemingly aggressive new legislation, and
methods of applying existing legislation to the problem of combating
terrorist use of the Internet for purposes of incitement, respectively.2 50
Despite taking the lead on responding to this issue, both states have
had relatively minimal success in trying to comply with the
international legal obligations they helped to create while keeping
within the confines of their domestic legal systems. 251 In the United
States, the primary constraint on prohibiting incitement by law has
been the First Amendment. 252 In the United Kingdom, the problem
has manifested itself as a divide between anti-terror legislation that is
aggressive in theory but limited in judicial application. 253 The result
in both cases has been a relatively unimpressive track record of
terrorism-related prosecutions and convictions. 254
245. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
246. See discussion supra Introduction.
247. See discussion supra Part I.A.
248. See discussion supra Part I.B.
249. See discussion supra Parts II.A.2, II.B.
250. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
251. See discussion supra Part III.
252. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
253. See discussion supra Part III.B.
254. See discussion supra Part III.
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A successful solution to the issue of combating incitement to
terrorism on the Internet must have two dimensions-each state must
fine tune its domestic legal system, whether by maximizing the utility
of existing laws or experimenting with new legislation, and, more
importantly, each state must cooperate with others to craft an
international solution to the problem based on the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities.255  Only with such a
comprehensive approach will the signatories of UNSCR 1624 achieve
compliance with their international legal obligations.
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